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ABSTRACT  
To build systems shielding users from fraudulent (or 
phishing) websites, designers need to know which attack 
strategies work and why.  This paper provides the first 
empirical evidence about which malicious strategies are 
successful at deceiving general users.  We first analyzed a 
large set of captured phishing attacks and developed a set 
of hypotheses about why these strategies might work.  We 
then assessed these hypotheses with a usability study in 
which 22 participants were shown 20 web sites and asked 
to determine which ones were fraudulent.   We found that 
23% of the participants did not look at browser-based 
cues such as the address bar, status bar and the security 
indicators, leading to incorrect choices 40% of the time.   
We also found that some visual deception attacks can fool 
even the most sophisticated users. These results illustrate 
that standard security indicators are not effective for a 
substantial fraction of users, and suggest that alternative 
approaches are needed.  
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INTRODUCTION 
What makes a web site credible?  This question has been 
addressed extensively by researchers in computer-human 
interaction. This paper examines a twist on this question:  
what makes a bogus website credible?  In the last two 
years, Internet users have seen the rapid expansion of a 
scourge on the Internet:  phishing, the practice of direct-
ing users to fraudulent web sites.  This question raises 
fascinating questions for user interface designers, because 
both phishers and anti-phishers do battle in user interface 
space.  Successful phishers must not only present a high-
credibility web presence to their victims; they must create 
a presence that is so impressive that it causes the victim to 
fail to recognize security measures installed in web 
browsers. 
Data suggest that some phishing attacks have convinced 
up to 5% of their recipients to provide sensitive informa-
tion to spoofed websites [21]. About two million users 
gave information to spoofed websites resulting in direct 
losses of $1.2 billion for U.S. banks and card issuers in 
2003 [20].1 
If we hope to design web browsers, websites, and other 
tools to shield users from such attacks, we need to under-
stand which attack strategies are successful, and what 
proportion of users they fool.  However, the literature is 
sparse on this topic. 
This paper addresses the question of why phishing works.  
We analyzed a set of phishing attacks and developed a set 
of hypotheses about how users are deceived.  We tested 
these hypotheses in a usability study:  we showed 22 par-
ticipants 20 web sites and asked them to determine which 
ones were fraudulent, and why.   Our key findings are: 
• Good phishing websites fooled 90% of participants. 
• Existing anti-phishing browsing cues are ineffective.  
23% of participants in our study did not look at the 
address bar, status bar, or the security indicators. 
• On average, our participant group made mistakes on 
our test set 40% of the time. 
                                                          
1Over 16,000 unique phishing attack websites were reported to 
the Anti-Phishing Working Group in November 2005 [2].   
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 • Popup warnings about fraudulent certificates were 
ineffective:  15 out of 22 participants proceeded 
without hesitation when presented with warnings. 
• Participants proved vulnerable across the board to 
phishing attacks.  In our study, neither education, 
age, sex, previous experience, nor hours of computer 
use showed a statistically significant correlation with 
vulnerability to phishing. 
RELATED WORK 
Research on Online Trust 
Researchers have developed models and guidelines on 
fostering online consumer trust [1, 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11, 15, 
16, 18, 19, 23, 28].  Existing literature deals with trust-
worthiness of website content, website interface design 
and policies, and mechanisms to support customer rela-
tions.  None of these papers consider that these indicators 
of trust may be spoofed and that the very same guidelines 
that are developed for legitimate organizations can also be 
adopted by phishers. 
Empirical research in online trust includes a study of how 
manipulating seller feedback ratings can influence con-
sumer trust in eBay merchants [4].  Fogg et al. conducted 
a number of large empirical studies on how users evaluate 
websites [10, 11] and developed guidelines for fostering 
credibility on websites, e.g., “Make it easy to verify the 
accuracy of the information on your site” [9]. 
User Studies of Browser Security and Phishing 
Friedman et al. interviewed 72 individuals about web se-
curity and found that participants could not reliably de-
termine whether a connection is secure. Participants were 
first asked to define and make non-verbal drawings of a 
secure connection.  They were next shown four screen 
shots of a browser connecting to a website and were asked 
to state if the connection was secure or not secure and the 
rationale for their evaluation [14]. In a related study, 
Friedman et al. surveyed 72 people about their concerns 
about potential risks and harms of web use [13]. 
We are aware of two empirical user studies that specifi-
cally focus on phishing.   Wu et al. conducted a user study 
to examine the impact of anti-phishing toolbars in pre-
venting phishing attacks [29].  Their results show that 
even when toolbars were used to notify users of security 
concerns, users were tricked into providing information 
34% of the time.  
Jagatic et al. investigated how to improve the success of 
phishing attacks by using the social network of the victim 
to increase the credibility of phishing email [17]. In the 
study, the experimenters gathered data from the Internet 
to create a social network map of university students, and 
then used the map to create forged phishing email appear-
ing to be from friends. 72% of users responded to the 
phishing email that was from a friend’s spoofed address, 
while only 16% of users responded in the control group to 
phishing email from an unknown address. 
ANALYSIS OF A PHISHING DATABASE 
The Anti Phishing Working Group maintains a “Phishing 
Archive” describing phishing attacks dating back to Sep-
tember 2003 [3].  We performed a cognitive walkthrough 
on the approximately 200 sample attacks within this ar-
chive. (A cognitive walkthrough evaluates the steps re-
quired to perform a task and attempts to uncover mis-
matches between how users think about a task and how 
the user interface designer thinks about the task [27].)  
Our goal was to gather information about which strategies 
are used by attackers and to formulate hypotheses about 
how lay users would respond to these strategies.   
Below we list the strategies, organized along three dimen-
sions:  lack of knowledge, visual deception, and lack of 
attention.  To aid readers who are unfamiliar with the 
topic, Table 1 defines several security terms. 
Certificate (digital certificate, public key certificate):
uses a digital signature to bind together a public key with an 
identity. If the browser encounters a certificate that has not been 
signed by a trusted certificate authority, it issues a warning to 
the user.  Some organizations create and sign their own self-
signed certificates.  If a browser encounters a self-signed certifi-
cate, it issues a warning and allows the user to decide whether to 
accept the certificate . 
Certificate Authority (CA): an entity that issues certificates 
and attests that a public key belongs to a particular identity. A 
list of trusted CAs is stored in the browser. A certificate may be 
issued to a fraudulent website by a CA without a rigorous verifi-
cation process. 
HTTPS: Web browsers use "HTTPS", rather than "HTTP" as a 
prefix to the URL to indicate that HTTP is sent over SSL/TLS. 
Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) and Transport Layer Security 
(TLS): cryptographic protocols used to provide authentication 
and secure communications over the Internet. SSL/TLS authen-
ticates a server by verifying that the server holds a certificate 
that has been digitally signed by a trusted certificate authority. 
SSL/TLS also allows the client and server to agree on an en-
cryption algorithm for securing communications. 
Table 1:  Security Terms and Definitions 
1. Lack of Knowledge 
1a) Lack of computer system knowledge.  Many users lack 
the underlying knowledge of how operating systems, ap-
plications, email and the web work and how to distinguish 
among these.  Phishing sites exploit this lack of knowl-
edge in several ways.  For example, some users do not 
understand the meaning or the syntax of domain names 
and cannot distinguish legitimate versus fraudulent URLs 
(e.g., they may think www.ebay-members-security.com 
belongs to www.ebay.com).  Another attack strategy 
forges the email header; many users do not have the skills 
to distinguish forged from legitimate headers.   
  
1b) Lack of knowledge of security and security indicators. 
Many users do not understand security indicators.  For 
example, many users do not know that a closed padlock 
icon in the browser indicates that the page they are view-
ing was delivered securely by SSL.  Even if they under-
stand the meaning of that icon, users can be fooled by its 
placement within the body of a web page (this confusion 
is not aided by the fact that competing browsers use dif-
ferent icons and place them in different parts of their dis-
play).   More generally, users may not be aware that pad-
lock icons appear in the browser “chrome” (the interface 
constructed by the browser around a web page, e.g., tool-
bars, windows, address bar, status bar) only under specific 
conditions (i.e., when SSL is used), while icons in the 
content of the web page can be placed there arbitrarily by 
designers (or by phishers) to induce trust.2 
Attackers can also exploit users’ lack of understanding of 
the verification process for SSL certificates. Most users 
do not know how to check SSL certificates in the browser 
or understand the information presented in a certificate.  
In one spoofing strategy, a rogue site displays a certificate 
authority's (CA) trust seal that links to a CA webpage. 
This webpage provides an English language description 
and verification of the legitimate site’s certificate.  Only 
the most informed and diligent users would know to 
check that the URL of the originating site and the legiti-
mate site described by the CA match. 
2. Visual Deception  
Phishers use visual deception tricks to mimic legitimate 
text, images and windows.  Even users with the knowl-
edge described in (1) above may be deceived by these. 
2a) Visually deceptive text. Users may be fooled by the 
syntax of a domain name in “typejacking” attacks, which 
substitute letters that may go unnoticed (e.g. 
www.paypai.com uses a lowercase “i” which looks simi-
lar to the letter “l”, and www.paypa1.com substitutes the 
number “1” for the letter “l”). Phishers have also taken  
advantage of non-printing characters [25] and non-ASCII 
Unicode characters [26] in domain names. 
2b) Images masking underlying text. One common tech-
nique used by phishers is to use an image of a legitimate 
hyperlink. The image itself serves as a hyperlink to a dif-
ferent, rogue site.   
                                                          
2For user convenience, some legitimate organizations allow 
users to login from non-SSL pages. For example, a bank might 
allow users to login from a non-SSL protected homepage.  Al-
though the user information may be transmitted securely, there 
is no visual cue in the browser to indicate if SSL is used for 
form submissions.  To “remedy” this, designers resort to placing 
a padlock icon in the page content, a tactic that phishers also 
exploit. 
2c) Windows masking underlying windows. A common 
phishing technique is to place an illegitimate browser 
window on top of, or next to, a legitimate window. If they 
have the same look and feel, users may mistakenly be-
lieve that both windows are from the same source, regard-
less of variations in address or security indicators.  In the 
worst case, a user may not even notice that a second win-
dow exists (browsers that allow borderless pop-up win-
dows aggravate the problem).  
2d) Deceptive look and feel.  If images and logos are cop-
ied perfectly, sometimes the only cues that are available 
to the user are the tone of the language, misspellings or 
other signs of unprofessional design.  If the phishing site 
closely mimics the target site, the only cue to the user 
might be the type and quantity of requested personal in-
formation. 
3. Bounded Attention 
Even if users have the knowledge described in (1) above, 
and can detect visual deception described in (2) above 
they may still be deceived if they fail to notice security 
indicators (or their absence). 
3a) Lack of attention to security indicators. Security is 
often a secondary goal. When users are focused on their 
primary tasks, they may not notice security indicators or 
read warning messages. The image-hyperlink spoof de-
scribed in (2b) above would thwarted if user noticed the 
URL in the status bar did not match the hyperlink image, 
but this requires a high degree of attention.  Users who 
know to look for an SSL closed-padlock icon may simply 
scan for the presence of a padlock icon regardless of posi-
tion and thus be fooled by an icon appearing in the body 
of a web page. 
3b) Lack of attention to the absence of security indicators. 
Users do not reliably notice the absence of a security indi-
cator. The Firefox browser shows SSL protected pages 
with four indicators (see Figure 1).  It shows none of these 
indicators for pages not protected by SSL.  Many users do 
not notice the absence of an indicator, and it is sometimes 
possible to insert a spoofed image of an indicator where 
one does not exist.  
STUDY: DISTINGUISHING LEGITIMATE WEBSITES 
To assess the accuracy of the hypotheses resulting from 
our cognitive walkthrough of phishing sites, we con-
ducted a usability study.  We presented participants with 
websites that appear to belong to financial institutions and 
e-commerce companies, some spoofed and some real.  
The participants’ task was to identify legitimate and 
fraudulent sites and describe the reasoning for their deci-
sions.  
Our study primed participants to look for spoofs. Thus, 
these participants are likely better than “real-world” (un-
primed) users at detecting fraudulent web sites.  If our 
 participants are fooled, real-world users are likely to also 
be fooled.   
 
Figure 1: Visual Security Indicators in Mozilla Firefox 
Browser v1.0.1 for Mac OS X. 
We focus on factors that are important for evaluating 
website security and authenticity, rather than the phishing 
email that lures users to those websites.   (Several studies 
evaluate users’ ability to detect fraudulent phishing email 
[17, 22].   As discussed in the related work section, there 
is less empirical data on how users verify the security and 
authenticity of potentially fraudulent websites.)  
Collection and Selection of Phishing Websites 
Using a web archiving application, we collected approxi-
mately 200 unique phishing websites, including all related 
links, images and web pages up to three levels deep for 
each site. To find these sites, we used phishing email that 
we and our colleagues received in June and July 2005.  
MailFrontier, an anti-spam firm, provided us additional 
phishing URLs harvested from phishing email received 
between July 20 and July 26, 2005.   
We selected nine phishing attacks, representative in the 
types of targeted brands, the types of spoofing techniques, 
and the types of requested information.  We also created 
three phishing websites, using advanced attacks observed 
by organizations monitoring phishing attacks [3, 24], but 
otherwise not represented in our sample.  (Full descrip-
tions of these sites are in [6].)  
3.4.2 Study Design 
We used a within-subjects design, where every participant 
saw every website, but in randomized order.  Participants 
were seated in front of a computer in a University class-
room and laboratory.  We used an Apple G4 Powerbook 
laptop running MAC OS X (version 10.3.9). We used the 
Mozilla Firefox browser version 1.0.1 for Mac OS X.  
Firefox offers advanced security features (see Figure 1). 
We created a webpage describing the study scenario and 
giving instructions, followed by a randomized list of hy-
perlinks to websites labeled “Website 1”, “Website 2”, 
etc.  We intentionally did not label the hyperlinks with the 
name of the website or organization that was supposedly 
being linked to.  Therefore, participants had no expecta-
tions about the site that they were about to visit or about 
upcoming sites they would visit next. 
We presented participants with 20 websites; the first 19 
were in random order: 
• 7 legitimate websites 
• 9 representative phishing websites 
• 3 phishing websites constructed by us using addi-
tional phishing techniques   
• 1 website requiring users to accept a self-signed SSL 
certificate (this website was presented last to segue 
into an interview about SSL and certificates).  
Each website that we presented was fully functioning, 
with images, links and sub-pages that users could interact 
with as they normally would with any website. The ar-
chived phishing web pages were hosted on an Apache 
web server running on the computer that was used for the 
user study. The settings of the computer (i.e., hosts file, 
DNS settings, Apache configuration files) were modified 
so that the website appeared in the browser exactly as it 
did in the actual phishing attack, with the same website 
structure and same URL.  To display the legitimate web-
sites, we provided a hyperlink to the actual website. 
Scenario and Procedure 
We presented the following scenario to participants: 
“Imagine that you receive an email message that asks you 
to click on one of the following links. Imagine that you 
decide to click on the link to see if it is a legitimate web-
site or a "spoof" (a fraudulent copy of that website).” 
We told participants that they could interact with the web-
site as users usually would, that the websites were ran-
domly selected, and that they might see multiple copies of 
the same website.  We informed participants any website 
may be legitimate or not, independent of what they previ-
ously saw. 
Participants signed a consent form, answered basic demo-
graphic questions, and read the study scenario and in-
structions. We then showed them the list of linked web-
sites. As each website was viewed, we asked the partici-
pant to say if the site was legitimate or not, state their 
confidence in their evaluation (on a scale of 1-5) and their 
reasoning. Participants were encouraged to talk out loud 
and vocalize their decision process.  We also asked par-
ticipants if they had used this website in the past or if they 
had an account at the website’s organization.   
  
We also observed participants’ interaction with a website 
that required accepting a self-signed SSL certificate.  Af-
terwards, we asked participants about their knowledge 
and use of certificates and SSL.  We also asked about 
experiences with phishing in general. 
Finally, we provided a debriefing, where we educated the 
participants about the incorrect answers they had given.  
We provided a brief overview of domain names and SSL 
indicators and how to interpret them.  We then revisited 
the other websites seen in the study to discuss the mis-
takes and correct assumptions that were made.   
Participant Recruitment and Demographics 
Our 22 participants were recruited by a university subjects 
recruiting service. This service uses a subscription based 
email list, which consists of students and staff who sign 
up voluntarily to participate in user studies.  The only 
requirement was that participants be familiar with use of 
computers, email and the Web.  They received a $15 fee 
for participating. 
The participants were 45.5% male (10 participants) and 
54.5% female (12 participants).  Age ranged from 18 to 
56 years old (M=29.9, s.d.= 10.8, variance=116). 
Half of the participants were university staff, and half 
were students. 19 participants (86%) were in non-
technical fields or areas of study.   3 (14%) were in tech-
nical fields. Of the staff, 8 participants (73%) had a 
Bachelors degree, 2 participants (18%) had a Masters 
degree, and 1 participant (9%) earned a J.D. degree.  Of 
the students, 7 participants (63.6%) were Bachelors, 2 
(18%) were Masters students, and 2 (18%) were Ph.D. 
students. 
As their primary browser, 11 participants (50%) use Mi-
crosoft Internet Explorer, 7 (32%) use Mozilla Firefox , 2 
(9%) reported using “Mozilla” (version unknown), and 1 
(4.5%) uses Apple Safari.    As their primary operating 
system, 13 participants (59%) use Windows XP, 6 (27%) 
use Mac OS X, 2 (9%) use Windows 2000, and 1 (4.5%) 
uses “Windows” (version unknown).  Most participants 
regularly use more than one type of browser and operat-
ing system. 
Hours of computer usage per week ranged from 10 to 135 
hours (M=37.8, s.d.= 28.5, variance=810.9). 18 partici-
pants regularly use online banking (or another financial 
service such as online bill payment or Paypal). 20 partici-
pants said they regularly shop online. 
RESULTS 
Participant Scores and Behavior 
The sum of the number of correctly identified legitimate 
and spoofed websites forms the participant’s score. Scores 
ranged from 6 to 18 correctly identified websites, out of 
19 websites.  (Mean 11.6, s.d.=3.2, variance=10.1).     
Sex: There is no significant difference when comparing 
the mean scores of males and females (t=1.97, df=20, 
p=.064). The mean score is 13 for males (s.d.=3.6, vari-
ance=13.1) and 10.5 for females (s.d.=2.3, variance=5.4).  
Age:  There is no significant correlation between partici-
pants’ scores and ages (r=.065, df=20, p=.772).   Younger 
participants did not perform better than older participants.      
Education level:  There is no significant correlation be-
tween education level and scores (Spearman rho=.24, 
n=22, p=.283).  
Hours using the computer: There is no significant corre-
lation between the weekly number of hours participants 
used computers and their scores (r= -.242, df=20, p=.278).  
One participant judged 18 out of 19 sites correctly but 
used computers only 14 hours per week while another 
participant judged only 7 websites correctly even though 
he spent 90 hours per week using computers. 
Previous use of browser, operating system or website: 
There is no significant correlation between the score and 
the primary or secondary type of browser or operating 
systems used by participants.  There is also no significant 
correlation between the previous use of a website and the 
ability to correctly judge the legitimacy of the purported 
(legitimate or phishing) website. 
In summary, among our participants, we did not observe a 
relationship between scores and sex, age, educational 
level or experience.  A larger study is needed to establish 
or rule out the existence of such effects in the general 
population.  
Strategies for Determining Website Legitimacy 
Participants used a variety of strategies to determine 
whether a site was legitimate or not. We categorized par-
ticipants by the types and number of factors they used to 
make decisions, using their behavior, statements made 
while evaluating websites and answers to our questions.   
Participants’ statements about indicators that they do or 
do not pay attention to were consistent with their behavior 
in the study.  
Type 1: Security indicators in website content only 
23% (5) participants used only the content of a webpage 
to determine legitimacy; including logos, layout and 
graphic design, presence of functioning links and images, 
types of information presented, language, and accuracy of 
information.  As we discuss below, many participants 
always looked for a certain type of content (e.g.. a pad-
lock icon, contact information, updated copyright infor-
mation) in making their decision.  None of these partici-
pants mentioned the address bar or any other part of the 
browser chrome as factors in their judgments.  Later, each 
confirmed that they do not look at these regions of the 
browser.  For example, one said, “I never look at the let-
 ters and numbers up there [in the address bar]. I’m not 
sure what they are supposed to say”.  
Participants in this category were at a disadvantage and 
received the five lowest scores (6, 7, 7, 9, 9).  Without 
looking at the URL, they could not recognize the differ-
ence between two sites that looked similar but that were 
hosted on different servers.  For example, when the phish-
ing page linked to a privacy policy hosted on a legitimate 
site, this group of participants confused the legitimate and 
bogus sites.  Phishers can exploit these users by creating 
what appears to be a rich and fully functioning website by 
linking to underlying pages on a legitimate site to boost 
credibility.  
Type 2: Content and domain name only 
36% (8) participants used the address bar to make judg-
ments in addition to the content factors mentioned above.  
This set of participants did not look for or notice any SSL 
indicators (including “HTTPS” in the address bar).  How-
ever, this category of users was at least aware when the 
address bar changed as they move from site to site.   They 
were able to distinguish addresses that contain IP numbers 
from those that contained domain names. Many did not 
know what an IP address is (participants referred to it as a 
“redirector address”, a “router number”, “ISP number”, 
“those number thingies in front of the name”), however, 
many of these participants had their suspicions heightened 
when they saw an IP address instead of a domain name. 
Type 3: Content and address, plus HTTPS 
9% (2) participants used the above factors but also relied 
on the presence of “HTTPS” in the address bar.  These 
participants did not notice or look for the SSL padlock 
icon.  In fact, one stated that she never noticed the SSL 
padlock icon in any browser chrome before this study 
(she was a Firefox and Safari user).  The other participant 
did use “HTTPS” in the address bar as a judgment factor, 
but incorrectly stated that site icons (favicons) in address 
bars indicate authenticity better because they “cannot be 
copied”.  
Type 4:  All of the above, plus padlock icon 
23% (5) participants relied on all of the above factors, but 
also looked for or noticed a padlock icon in the browser 
chrome. In the interview, we discovered that even if they 
noticed the padlock icon, some participants gave more 
credence to padlock icons that appeared within the con-
tent of the page.  
Type 5: All of above, plus certificates 
9% (2) participants relied on all of the above factors and 
also checked the certificate that was presented to their 
browser in our study.  Both said that they have checked 
certificates in the past and that they occasionally check 
them if they are uncertain about the site’s identity (e.g., 
when the browser presents a warning).  
Additional Strategies 
Two participants in our study stated that in general, they 
would only question a website’s legitimacy if more than 
the username and password was requested.  One partici-
pant actually submitted her username and password to 
some websites in order to verify if it was a site at which 
she had an account. She stated that this is a strategy that 
she has used reliably in practice to determine site authen-
ticity. Her reasoning was “What’s the harm?  Passwords 
are not dangerous to give out, like financial information 
is”.  This participant admitted she does use the same 
password for many sites, but never considered that pass-
words obtained at one website might be used for fraudu-
lent purposes at another site.  She used Type 1 strategies, 
with a score of 7 out of 19 of websites judged correctly.  
Another participant was at the other end of the spectrum. 
He opened up another browser window, where he typed in 
all URLs by hand in order to compare these pages to 
every website presented in the study.  He also occasion-
ally used Yahoo to search for the organization in question.  
He would click on the top search result and compare it to 
the website presented in the study.  He stated that ever 
since a family member was the victim of a PayPal phish-
ing attack, he now follows these steps in practice to pro-
tect himself.  He used Type 4 strategies and scored 18 out 
of 19 sites judged correctly. 
 
Figure 2: Mean Scores by Strategy Type (higher is better). 
Comparison of Mean Scores Between Strategy Types 
Figure 2 compares the mean number of websites judged 
correctly across strategy types. A one-way ANOVA re-
veals that correct judgment scores differed significantly as 
a function of strategy (F(4, 17) = 7.83, p =.001).  A Tukey 
post-hoc test reveals that the scores for Type 1 strategy 
users - those who use only the website content to deter-
mine legitimacy - differ significantly from Type 2, 4 and 
5 strategy users. 
  
Website Difficulty 
After participants judged each website as legitimate or 
not, we asked them to rate how confident they were of 
this decision (on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 was the least 
confident and 5 was the most confident). In general, par-
ticipants were very confident of their decisions, whether 
they were correct or incorrect.  The lowest average confi-
dence level is 3.0. 
Table 2 shows the websites ranked from most difficult 
(highest number of incorrect judgments) to least difficult 
(highest number of correct judgments), the average confi-
dence level for each judgment, and the spoofing (fraudu-
lent sites) or security (legitimate sites) strategies used.  
Figure 3: Bank of the West Phishing Site 
Phishing Websites 
Figure 3 shows the phishing website that fooled the most 
participants is an exact replica of the Bank of the West 
homepage. The website is hosted at 
“www.bankofthevvest.com”, with two “v”s instead of a 
“w” in the domain name.  
90.9% (20 participants) incorrectly judged this to be the 
legitimate Bank of the West website.  17 participants 
mentioned the content of the page as one reason for their 
decision.  For many participants the “cute” design, the 
level of detail and the fact that the site does not ask for a 
great deal of information were the most convincing fac-
tors.  Two participants mentioned the animated bear video 
that appears on the page, (e.g., “because that would take a 
lot of effort to copy”).  Participants in general found this 
animation appealing and many reloaded the page just to 
see the animation again.  
8 participants relied on links to other sites to support their 
decisions.  6 of these clicked on the Verisign logo:  when 
clicked, a window popped up a window displaying an 
SSL protected webpage, hosted at Verisign, that shows 
the SSL certificate status of www.bankofthewest.com.  
Unfortunately, any site can provide a link to this popup 
page3 in order to gain credibility.  A participant must 
compare the URL displayed in the popup to the URL in 
the address bar to detect that they are not referring to the 
same website. 
One participant clicked on a link to display the Chinese 
version of this website, which linked to the actual Bank of 
the West website.  Her native language is Chinese, and 
she believed that a “fake website could never be this 
good”.  One participant clicked on a link to a “consumer 
alert”, a link to the real website that describes tips for 
protecting against phishing attacks.  
In fact, three participants said the correctness of the URL 
was the primary factor in deciding that this was a legiti-
mate site. One of these was a Bank of the West account 
holder.  He used a Type 5 strategy (i.e., used all browser 
security indicators) and had expert security knowledge. 
He stated that the use of “BOW/index.html” in the URL 
matched his memory of the legitimate web site.  This in-
dicates that even users who are knowledgeable and have 
familiarity with the website can be fooled by visual de-
ception attacks.   
9.1% (2 participants) correctly judged this to be a spoof 
site.  Only one participant detected the double “v” in the 
domain name (she was the oldest participant in the 53-58 
age range and used a Type 2 strategy with no security 
knowledge). One participant noticed an outdated date in 
the content of the webpage (many phishing sites display 
the date at which the page was copied from the original). 
Participant Knowledge of Phishing and Security 
We used participant responses to the websites to guide a 
semi-structured interview about their knowledge of 
browser security indicators and of phishing in general. 
Knowledge and Experience with Phishing. 7 participants 
had never heard the term “phishing” before this study 
(some participants seemed genuinely surprised that these 
attacks even occur). However, all participants said that 
they do receive spam email that asks them to visit a web-
site and provide information, log in to update accounts, 
verify records etc. 
Participants mentioned various strategies for dealing with 
phishing email, including automatically deleting or filter-
ing suspicious email (7 participants), and occasionally 
                                                          
3https://seal.verisign.com/splash?form_file=fdf/splash.fdf
&dn=WWW.BANKOFTHEWEST.COM&lang=en 
 Website 
 
Real or 
Spoof 
Phishing or Security Tactic Used 
(Partial List) 
% Right   
(avg conf)
% Wrong 
(avg conf)
Bank Of the West Spoof URL (bankofthevvest.com), padlock in content, Verisign logo and 
certificate validation seal, consumer alert warning 
9 (3.0) 91 (4.2) 
PayPal Spoof Uses Mozilla XML User Interface Language (XUL) to simulate 
browser chrome w/ fake address bar, status bar and SSL indicators 
18 (3.0) 81 (4.5) 
Etrade Real 3rd party URL (etrade.everypath.com), SSL, simple design, no 
graphics for mobile users 
23 (4.6) 77 (4.2) 
PayPal Spoof URL (paypal-signin03.com), padlock in content  41 (4.0) 59 (3.7) 
PayPal Spoof URL (IP address), padlock in content 41 (3.9) 59 (4.5) 
Capital One Real 3rd party URL (cib.ibanking-services.com), SSL, dedicated login 
page, simple design  
50 (3.9) 50 (3.5) 
Paypal Spoof Screenshot of legitimate SSL protected Paypal page within a rogue 
webpage 
50 (4.7) 50 (4.3) 
Ameritrade Spoof URL (ameritrading.net) 50 (4.2) 50 (3.9) 
Bank of America Spoof Rogue popup window on top of legitimate BOFA homepage, pad-
lock in content 
64 (4.2) 36 (4.4) 
Bank Of The West Spoof URL (IP address), urgent anti-fraud warnings (requests large 
amount of personal data) 
68 (4.8) 32 (4.4) 
USBank Spoof URL (IP address), padlock in content, security warnings, identity 
verification (requests large amount of personal data) 
68 (4.1) 32 (4.3) 
Ebay Spoof URL (IP address), account verification (requests large amount of 
personal data) 
68 (4.4) 32 (4.0) 
Yahoo Spoof URL (center.yahoo-security.net), account verification (requests 
large amount of personal data) 
77 (3.0) 23 (4.2) 
NCUA Spoof URL (IP address), padlock in content, account verification (re-
quests large amount of personal data) 
82 (4.5) 18 (4.3) 
Ebay Real SSL protected login page, TRUSTe logo 86 (4.4) 14 (4.0) 
Bank Of America Real Login page on non-SSL homepage, padlock in content 86 (4.4) 14 (3.3) 
Tele-Bears  
(Student Accounts) 
Real SSL protected login page 91 (4.7) 9 (4.5) 
PayPal Real Login page on non-SSL homepage, padlock in content 91 (4.6) 9 (3.0) 
Bank One Real Login page on non-SSL homepage, padlock in content 100 (4.0) 0 (N/A) 
Table 2: Security or spoofing strategy employed by each site (spoof sites shown with white background, real sites gray). 
open suspicious email (15 participants).  Of these, 6 do 
not ever click links from email and 5 will click on a link if 
it looks interesting. 2 only click on links if it from a web-
site where they have an account. One will click on links 
from email only if associated with a specific transaction. 
One will click on any type of link at work where she has 
virus protection and system administrators to fix her ma-
chine, but never at home. All said they regularly click on 
links from friends, work colleagues and email sent by 
university organizations. 
9 participants reported experiencing confusion about 
whether a site is legitimate. 5 reported serious incidents, 
where they or their family were tricked into proving per-
sonal information to a fraudulent online party.  
Knowledge and Use of Padlock Icon and HTTPS. When 
asked about the meaning of the SSL padlock icon, 4 par-
ticipants said they do not know what the padlock icon 
means and could not give any explanation for its pres-
ence. 5 participants mentioned the concept of security but 
could not identify what was secured or protected. 10 par-
ticipants mentioned the concept of securing data that is 
sent by the user to the server. One stated that the SSL 
padlock icon indicated that the page sent from the server 
to the user was delivered securely.  One participant incor-
  
rectly stated that it was a sign that the website could not 
read passwords or set cookies. 
15 participants stated that they never pay attention or no-
tice the padlock icon, and that it does not affect their be-
havior (One of these participants, who was a Firefox and 
Safari participant, said that she had never noticed the se-
curity padlock in the browser before, only in the content 
of a page). 7 participants stated that they occasionally 
look for or notice the padlock. 
13 participants stated that they never pay attention to 
“HTTPS” in the address bar.  5 stated that they never look 
at the address bar at all. 
Knowledge and Use of Firefox SSL indicators. 17 partici-
pants did not notice the Firefox address bar SSL indica-
tors during the study (3 of these were regular Firefox us-
ers and stated that they never noticed these indicators be-
fore they were pointed out in the study). Only 5 partici-
pants noticed the additional SSL indicators. Of these, 3 
noticed the yellow background but didn’t understand what 
it means (2 were Firefox users and one was an IE user).  
One Firefox user stated “I thought that was just part of the 
website design”. Only 2 participants noticed the yellow 
background and understood that this was correlated with 
HTTPS (2 of these were Firefox users). 
Knowledge and Use of Certificates. When presented with 
a browser warning for a self signed certificate, 15 partici-
pants immediately selected “OK” without reading the 
warning dialogue.  The default option selected in this case 
is to “Accept this certificate temporarily for this session”. 
When asked if they knew what they just accepted or de-
clined, only one participant was able to correctly articu-
late the choice he had just made.   18 responded that they 
did not know and 3 gave incorrect answers (i.e., “I ac-
cepted the use of cookies”; “It asked me if I wanted to 
save my password on forms”; “It was a message from the 
website about spyware”). 
Only one participant gave a correct definition of the pur-
pose of certificates and could interpret the website certifi-
cate that we asked the participants to inspect (he was a 
system administrator). 19 participants stated that they 
have never checked a certificate before.  Only 3 partici-
pants stated that they ever checked a certificate (or saw 
something similar to the certificate that was shown). 
Support for Hypotheses and Addition of New Ones 
This study verified two types of hypotheses formulated in 
the examination of phishing sites. (The design of the 
study precludes testing for lack of attention, because we 
ask users to focus on security.)  Participants made incor-
rect judgments because they lacked knowledge of how 
computer systems worked and did not have an under-
standing of security systems and indicators.  More experi-
enced participants were tripped up by visual deception, 
e.g., when the address was spoofed or when images of the 
browser chrome with security indicators were copied into 
website content. The study also revealed issues that we 
did not anticipate from the cognitive walkthrough: 
1c) Lack of knowledge of web fraud. Some users don’t 
know that spoofing websites is possible.  Without aware-
ness phishing is possible, some users simply do not ques-
tion website legitimacy.   
1d) Erroneous security knowledge. Some users have mis-
conceptions about which website features indicate secu-
rity.  For example, participants assumed that if websites 
contained professional-looking images, animations, and 
ads, they assumed the sites were legitimate (influenced by 
well-known trust indicators, discussed below).  Similarly, 
dedicated login pages from banks were less trusted than 
those originating from a homepage; several participants 
mentioned a lack of images and links as a reason for their 
distrust. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This study illustrates that even in the best case scenario, 
when users expect spoofs to be present and are motivated 
to discover them, many users cannot distinguish a legiti-
mate website from a spoofed website. In our study, the 
best phishing site was able to fool more than 90% of par-
ticipants. 
Indicators that are designed to signal trustworthiness were 
not understood (or even noticed) by many participants. 5 
out of 22 (23%) participants only used the content of the 
website to evaluate its authenticity, without looking at any 
other portions of the browser. A number of participants 
incorrectly said a padlock icon is more important when it 
is displayed within the page than if presented by the 
browser.  Other participants were more persuaded by 
animated graphics, pictures, and design touches such as 
favicons (icons in the URL bar) than SSL indicators. 
Furthermore, the indicators of trust presented by the 
browser are trivial to spoof.  By using very simple spoof-
ing attacks, such as copying images of browser chrome or 
the SSL indicators in the address bar or status bar, we 
were able to fool even our most careful and knowledge-
able users. 
Knowing this, phishers can falsify a rich and fully func-
tioning site with images, links, logos and images of secu-
rity indicators, and a significant fraction of our partici-
pants were confident that the spoofed websites were le-
gitimate.  Similarly, legitimate organizations that follow 
security precautions, such as allowing users to only login 
from dedicated SSL protected pages, are penalized and 
were judged by some of our participants to be less trust-
worthy.  Legitimate organizations further confused our 
participants by hosting secure pages with third parties, 
where the domain name does not match the brand name.  
 Our study suggests that a different approach is needed in 
the design of security systems. Rather than approaching 
the problem solely from a traditional cryptography-based 
security framework (what can we secure?), a usable de-
sign must take into account what humans do well and 
what they do not do well.  When building a system that is 
designed to resist spoofing, we must assume uniform 
graphic designs can be easily copied, and we must help 
the user to distinguish legitimate security indicators from 
those that have been spoofed.  It is not sufficient for secu-
rity indicators to appear only under trusted conditions- it 
is equally, if not more, important to alert users to the un-
trusted state.  Finally, security interface designers must 
consider that indicators placed outside of the user’s pe-
riphery or focus of attention (e.g., using colors in the ad-
dress bar to indicate suspicious and trusted sites [12]) may 
be ignored entirely by some users.  
To address some of these issues, we have designed and 
are currently testing a new approach that allows a remote 
server to prove its identity in a way that is easy for a user 
to verify (exploiting the human ability to easily match 
images) but difficult for an attacker to spoof [7].   
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